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Abstract 
 
Dretske has recently offered a representational theory of perceptual experience - 
considered as paradigmatic of the qualitative and phenomenal aspects of our mental life. 
This theory belongs, as do his previous works, to a naturalistic approach to mental 
representation. 
I would like to highlight some difficulties that arise when this representational 
approach is extended to certain qualitative aspects of the mental. First, I give a general 
outline of Dretske’s representationalist strategy, mentioning along the way certain 
modifications or novelties in his use of distinctions he had previously drawn. I then 
focus on three aspects of his theory that seem to me to involve potential problems or 
inconsistencies. I first concentrate on the way Dretske uses his distinction between first-
order consciousness and second-order consciousness in his account of the phenomenon 
of blindsight. My second concern is with the problem of qualia inversion — the 
theoretical possibility of which Dretske acknowledges — and his treatment of it in 
representational terms. Lastly, I criticize Dretske’s idea that the qualitative differences 
between perceptual experiences in different modalities always reduce to differences in 
the sensory properties the perceived scene or object is represented as having or to 
differences in the conceptual elaborations based on those properties. I suggest that we 
can get a more accurate insight into the nature of these modality-related differences if 
we examine their potential relations with, on the one hand, the role or function of 
consciousness in perception and with, on the other hand, that special character of the 
relation to the object in perception that Husserl described as ‘Leibhaftigkeit’. 
 
Résumé 
 
Dretske a récemment proposé une théorie représentationnelle de l'expérience 
perceptive — considérée comme manifestation paradigmatique des aspects qualitatifs et 
phénoménaux de notre vie mentale. Cette théorie s'inscrit, comme ses travaux 
antérieurs, dans le cadre d’une approche naturaliste des représentations mentales.  
Je souhaiterais mettre en évidence certaines difficultés que pose l’extension de cette 
approche aux aspects qualitatifs du mental. Je présente d’abord dans ses grandes lignes 
la stratégie représentationnaliste de Dretske et indique au passage certains 
infléchissements ou usages nouveaux de distinctions qu’il avait antérieurement 
élaborées. Je me concentre ensuite sur trois aspects de sa théorie qui me semblent 
problématiques. Il s’agit, premièrement, de l’application que fait Dretske de la 
distinction entre deux ordres de conscience dans son analyse du phénomène du 
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blindsight. Il s’agit, deuxièmement, du problème des inversions qualitatives, dont il 
admet la possibilité, et du traitement qu’il en propose en termes représentationnels. 
Enfin, je critique l'idée de Dretske selon laquelle les différences qualitatives entre 
expériences perceptives associées à des modalités sensorielles distinctes ne sont jamais 
imputables à la seule différence des modalités prise en elle-même mais sont toujours 
liées soit à des différences concernant les propriétés sensorielles représentées soit à des 
différences d'exploitation conceptuelle. A cette occasion, j’essaie d’indiquer certains 
liens possibles entre la fonction de la conscience perceptive, la distinction des modalités 
et ce caractère spécifique du rapport à l’objet dans la perception, que Husserl désignait 
du nom de ‘Leibhaftigkeit’. 
 
 
 
 
Philosophical attitudes towards qualia divide into three main types. First, there are 
qualia enthousiasts who claim that qualia exist and do not reduce to anything else. These 
philosophers also typically consider that the existence of qualia is sufficient to doom 
physicalist or functionalist approaches to the mind. Supporters of qualia elimination are 
to be found at the opposite end of the spectrum. They deny that mental states and events 
actually possess the qualitative properties attributed to them by qualia friends and, as a 
consequence, they advocate quining qualia. In between these two extreme positions 
stand the advocates of demystification. They admit the existence of qualia but they try to 
dissipate the air of mystery that surrounds them by showing that they can be accounted 
for in functional or representational terms.  
Dretske belongs to this last category. In his Jean Nicod lectures (Dretske, 1995), he 
offers a through defense of the representational thesis that “all mental facts are 
representational facts”. In these lectures, he concentrates on the mental facts that seem 
most refractory to a representational approach, namely facts concerning the subjective 
aspects of mental life, to be found in particular in perceptual experience. This theory of 
the subjective elements of mental life is meant as an extension of Dretske’s previous 
works on intentionality and perception and it makes use of distinctions elaborated in 
those works. It seems to me, however, that the treatment Dretske proposes of some 
phenomena concerning qualitative aspects of our mental life is less than satisfactory. In 
particular, it is the case with his treatment of the problem of blindsight, with his 
treatment of the problem of qualia inversion, and finally with his account of the possible 
nature of the qualitative differences among perceptual experiences in different sensory 
modalities. 
In the present paper, I shall concentrate on the theory offered by Dretske (1995) in 
order to account for the qualitative aspects of perceptual experience, i. e. for the way 
things appear to us in perception. This theory is based on a theory of representation and 
on a theory of introspective knowledge. The first section gives a general outline of 
Dretske’s representational strategy as it applies to perceptual experience. In section II, 
Dretske’s theory of introspective knowledge is examined and the issue of the 
relationship between perceptual experience and consciousness is discussed, in particular 
with regards to the problem of blindsight. Sections III and IV examine the way in which 
Dretske conceives of the possible differences between qualitative experiences. Section 
III is concerned with the problem of qualitative inversions. Section IV discusses the 
problem of the distinctions among qualitative experiences in different modalities. In this 
fourth section, I attempt to point out a number of possible links between the function of 
perceptual awareness, the distinction among sensory modalities, and the special 
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character of the relation to the object in perception that Husserl described as 
‘Leibhaftigkeit’ or ‘bodily presence’. 
 
I 
According to Dretske’s ‘Representational Thesis’, all mental facts are 
representational facts. From this thesis it follows that the qualities of perceptual 
experiences must be constituted by the properties things are represented as having. By a 
representational fact, Dretske means a fact about a representational system or state as 
representational, in other words, it is a fact about what information the system or state is 
supposed to carry. Representational facts constitute a subset of facts about 
representations. The latter are not necessarily facts about representations as 
representations; for instance, they can be facts about physical features of representations 
that have no direct link to their representational content. 
Dretske contends that perceptual experience constitutes a type of natural, non-
conceptual representation. The notion of representation he makes use of is the notion he 
had defined in Explaining Behaviour (1988). It combines informational ideas — with 
the notion of indication — and teleological ideas — with the notion of a function of 
indicating. Very crudely then, a representation is a thing whose function is to carry 
information. In the theory of representations Dretske proposes, three distinctions play a 
pivotal role. The first distinction is between natural vs. conventional representations. 
When of a thing’s information-providing function is derived from the intentions and 
purposes of its designers, makers or users, the resulting representations are conventional. 
By constrast, natural representations do not owe their informational function to the 
intentions or purposes of external designers. According to Dretske, perceptual 
representations are natural representations: the senses have information-providing 
functions, biological functions, that they derive from their evolutionary history. The 
perceptual systems produce representations of those conditions they have the function of 
informing us about. 
However, perceptual representations must be distinguished from other types of 
natural representations, such as beliefs and thoughts. Whereas the latter are conceptual 
representations, the former are sensory and not conceptual representations. This 
distinction between sensory and conceptual representations rests, according to Dretske, 
on a distinction between the possible sources of the information-providing functions of a 
(token) representational state. A state can derive its function from the system of which it 
is a state, in which case it has a systemic indicator function and hence gives rise to a 
systemic representation (representations). Or, a token state may acquire its indicator 
function, not from the system of which it is a state, but from the type of state of which it 
is a token (representationa). Functions of this latter type are acquired indicator functions 
and they are independent of the systemic indicator function that the state types may also 
have. 
Dretske proposes that we identify perceptual experiences with states whose 
representational properties are systemic and that thoughts and conceptual representations 
in general be identified with states whose representational properties are acquired. More 
precisely, Dretske conceives of the relationship between perceptual experience and 
conceptual thought in the following way: “Experiences are those natural representationss 
that service the construction of representationsa, representationsa that can be calibrated 
(by learning) to more effectively service an organism’s needs and desires. They are the 
states whose functions it is to supply information to a cognitive system for calibration 
and use in the control and regulation of behavior” (1995: 19). 
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It is important here to distinguish clearly between two different, although 
complementary, senses in which it is possible to say that a state has a function. On the 
one hand, a given state can have an informational or indicator function; on the other 
hand, this same state has a role to play in the economy of a cognitive system, it has what 
could be called an organizational function. To take a favorite example of Dretske’s, a 
thermostat has a representational function insofar as its function is to carry information 
about temperature in the environment. But considered, for instance, as an element in a 
central heating system, it has also an organizational function: its function in this sense is 
to control the furnace ignition. As for sensory representations, their representational 
function is to carry information about certain phenomenal properties in the environment 
of the system to which they belong. Their organizational function is to supply this 
information to the rest of the cognitive system. There exists an important link between 
the two functions.2 The acquisition3 by a state type of a representational status goes 
hand in hand with the acquisition of an organizational or control job in the system. The 
tokens of the state type may — and should — have indicator properties before being 
recruited for a control job, but it is only by being thus recruited that they acquire an 
indicator function. In the case of representations that are the outcome of natural 
selection, as is the case, according to Dretske, of sensory representations, the story is the 
following. Evolution has conferred tokens of a given state type in a given species the 
function of carrying information about the presence of, say, Fs, because in the past, in 
certain members of the species such tokens carried information about the presence of Fs 
and happened to play a role in the control of certain behaviors the success of which 
depended on the presence of Fs. This does not mean that a given indicator function and 
a given control duty are for ever associated. A state type can acquire new control duties 
without losing its representational function or, in some cases, it can change its 
representational function without changing its control duty, but the establishing of a 
representational function requires the simutaneous establishing of an organizational 
function. 
Finally, it should be noted that sensory systems have, according to Dretske, 
phylogenetic functions and are, therefore, comparatively modular. Hence, systemic 
sensory representations are fixed. This does not mean that our perceptual experiences 
are immune to change through time, but it means that such changes are the result not of 
a modification of the systemic sensory representations but of the addition of one or 
several new layers of acquired representations. The qualitative aspects of our 
representational experiences are thus, for Dretske, phylogenetically determined. The 
subjective quality of an experience, what it is like to have this experience, is simply the 
way this experience representss things to be. 
 
II 
I now want to examine Dretske’s view of the relationship between qualia thus 
conceived and consciousness and the application he makes of his conception in the 
account he suggests of the phenomenon of blindsight. I shall start with some 
clarifications concerning Dretske’s terminology. Dretske (1995: 97 sq) protests againts 
                                                 
2 In particular, this link plays an essential role in Dretske’s account of the causal efficacy of mental 
content. However, I will not discuss here the issue of the causal efficacy of mental contents, since it 
seems that, for Dretske, only acquired representations can properly be said to have a causal efficacy 
in virtue of their contents and since the sensory representations I am concerned with are, according to 
him, systemic and not acquired. 
3 “Acquisition” should be taken here in a broad sense covering both acquisition by an individual in 
the course of learning and acquisition by a species in the course of evolution. 
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what he takes to be a common misunderstanding of the distinction between two uses of 
the term “conscious”. The first, transitive, use corresponds to the application we make 
of the word conscious when we say of a being that he is conscious of something. It 
corresponds to what Rosenthal (1990) calls creature consciousness. This sense is to be 
distinguished from the use one makes of the word when one says of a state or process 
that it is conscious. This second use corresponds to what Rosenthal calls state 
consciousness and it it intransitive in the sense that saying of a state that it is conscious 
is not saying that the state is conscious of something. However — and this is the 
misunderstanding Dretske wants to expose —, when we attribute consciousness to a 
state, an experience or a process in this intransitive sense, we are not, by the same token, 
attributing this state, experience or process an intrinsic property. The difference between 
a conscious and an unconsicous experience (or state, or process) is not, according to 
Dretske, a difference in the experience, it is a difference in the experiencer (the owner of 
the state or process).  
Thus, granted that when Dretske speaks of a conscious experience he does not intend 
to attribute to this experience a real, non-relational property that would distinguish it 
from unconscious experiences, there nevertheless remain two things he may want to say. 
First, he may want to say that the creature who has an experience is conscious of the 
object or property of which this experience constitutes a sensory representation. For 
instance, if I hear the sound of a French horn and thus have an auditory experience of a 
French horn, one may say that I have a conscious experience of the French Horn, in the 
sense that I am aware of an auditory event, but this does not require the bringing into 
play of conceptual abilities — I don’t need to have the concept of a French horn — or 
the bringing into play of metarepresentational capacities — I don’t need to represent my 
auditory experience as an experience. This is a sense of ‘conscious experience’ Dretske 
explicitely endorses, when he claims that conscious states are states that “make one 
conscious of whatever properties the representation is a representation of and, if there is 
such, whatever objects [...] these properties are properties of” (1995: 104). The second 
possibility is that by ‘conscious experience’ one means an experience such that the 
creature who is having this experience is conscious of having the experience, that it has 
a representation of this experience as an experience. In the ensuing discussion, I shall 
speak of consciousness1 when referring to a conscious experience in the first sense, and 
of consciousness2 when referring to a conscious experience in the second sense. 
Given the way Dretske defines perceptual experience — namely in purely 
representational terms — it would seem that all perceptual experience is by definition 
conscious1 since an experience is a systemic sensory representation of an object (or a 
state of affairs) and since the qualitative properties of the experience are identified by 
Dretske to the phenomenal properties that the object or state of affairs is represented as 
having. However, we should avoid as much as possible making the notion of 
consciousness1 too trivial. It is not enough that a state be representational in order for it 
to be conscious1. Probably, Dretske would want to distinguish between a 
representational state that is merely present in an organism and a representational state 
that is present for the organism. If we consider, for instance, Marr’s theory of vision, we 
are not conscious1 of the primal sketch, not because it is not a representational state, but 
because the information contained in this state is not available to the system as a whole 
for further elaboration and use in the control and regulation of behavior. One may 
nevertheless regret that Dretske does not give us any specific account of the conditions 
that must be satisfied for a system to count as conscious1. I am not conscious1 of the 
primal sketches worked out by my perceptual modules. But should I accept that the 
modules themselves are conscious1 of the representational contents of the primal 
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sketches since they make use of them in order to construct more elaborate 
representations? Thus, there remain in Dretske’s approach unresolved difficulties 
concerning (1) the conditions that must obtain in order for a state to be considered as 
present for the system and not merely in the system, and (2) the conditions that must 
obtain for a system to count as conscious1. These difficulties being noted, one may say 
that a creature satisfying the conditions to be spelled out in (2) and having 
representations satisfying the conditions to be spelled out in (1) would be conscious1, in 
the sense that it would be aware of the objects that these representational states are 
representations of? 
What about consciousness2? What can it consist in given Dretske’s representational 
theory of experience? Dretske claims to be defending a cautious approach to qualia that 
operates with a minimal conception of them. In particular, Dretske refuses to burden 
himself from the start with a characterisation of qualia that includes the features 
cataloged and questioned by Dennett (1988)4. He nevertheless considers, in agreement 
with Shoemaker (1991), that even a minimal characterisation of qualia should include 
accessibility to consciousness, by which he clearly means consciousness2, the capacity 
that a creature has to represent introspectively to itself its experiences as such. This 
accessibility to consciousness thesis can be given a stronger or a weaker reading. Before 
I examine the reasons one can offer in favor of one or the other of these readings, I give 
a more precise description of what the fact for an experience to be conscious2 can 
consist in given Dretske’s representational thesis.  
Dretske holds that the awareness we may have of our perceptual experiences 
constitutes a particular instance of introspective knowledge. Introspective knowledge in 
general is the knowledge of representational facts about our mental representations. It 
consists in metarepresentations, that is to say, according to Perner’s (1991) definition, in 
the representation of representations as representations. Conscious2 perceptual 
experience is thus introspective knowledge of our systemic sensory representations as 
representations. But how do we come by such knowledge, how can we know our mental 
representations as representations? 
According to Dretske’s account, introspective knowledge is an instance of displaced 
perception and can be described as a knowledge of internal facts via an awareness of 
external objects. Dretske gives several examples of displaced perception. One listens for 
the sound of a timer to find out when the cake in the oven is done, one learns that too 
much sugar consumption endangers one’s health by reading the newspapers and one 
realizes that one should have resisted treating oneself without restraint to chocolate cake 
when one sees the position of the needle on the bathroom scale. As Dretske puts it: “In 
such cases one comes to know that k is F — sees that k is F — by seeing and hearing 
not k itself but h. The perceptual fact is displaced from the perceptual object” (1995: 
41). Perceptual displacement occurs when there there is conceptual but no 
corresponding sensory representation of an object. The chocolate addict who sees by 
looking at his bathroom scale that he has gained weight has a sensory representation of 
the scale and of some of its properties (its color, shape, size, orientation, etc.) but he has 
a conceptual representation of himself has having gained superfluous weight.  
The existence of displaced perception requires that the subject believes in the 
existence of an appropriate link between the properties of the sensuously represented 
object and the properties of the conceptually represented object. Dretke’s suggestion is 
                                                 
4 According to Dennett (1988), qualia are traditionally taken to have the following four 
fundamental properties: they are supposed to be ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly or 
immediately apprehensible to consciousness. 
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that we consider introspective knowledge as being both an instance of 
metarepresentation and an instance of displaced perception. Introspective knowledge 
thus consists in a representation of a representation (k) as a representation (F). It is 
moreover an instance of displaced perception insofar as we have a conceptual 
representation of k as being F by having a sensory representation of some other object h 
as being G. Dretske’s thesis is that the hs and Gs are none other than the objects and 
properties already present in the representation subjected to introspection. According to 
the example he takes, if E is an experience of blue, then introspective knowledge of this 
experience is a conceptual representation of it as an experience of blue and we have a 
conceptual representation of E as a representation of blue by having a sensory 
representation of the object that the experience E represents as blue.  
According to Dretske, every representational system carries information on the way it 
represents the world to be. A system representing the world necessarily occupies a state 
that carries information on how the world would be if the system was functioning 
properly and it is the representational state it is in that carries this information. This is 
what constitutes the fundamental asymmetry between the situation of an external 
observer and that of a system introspecting its own states. The external observer does 
not occupy the state whose representational content he is investigating. Thus, he is 
forced to attend both to the states of the representational system he investigates and to 
the states of the world in order to determine what the contents of the system’s states are. 
By contrast, the privilege of introspection consists in the fact that the representational 
system itself can occupy the states that are being investigated. He thus has available to 
himself information to which no other system has a direct access, namely information 
on how the world would be if it was functioning properly as a representational system.  
According to Dretske, this informational privilege is shared by all representational 
systems, but this does not mean that all representational systems are capable of 
introspection. Every representational system, in representing the world, has all the 
information it needs to know how it is representing the world, but for it to have self 
knowledge it must also be able to exploit this information. This requires 
metarepresentational capacities that a large number of representational systems lack. For 
a system to be capable of introspective knowledge, it is further required that it have the 
conceptual resources for representing the fact to be known and an appropriate 
‘connecting belief’ about the relationship between the information it gets by perceiving 
the external world and the facts concerning its own representational states. 
After these clarifications, we can come back to the thesis that qualia must be 
accessible to consciousness. One can give this thesis a strong ontological reading and 
take it as claiming that it is constitutive of qualia and hence of perceptual experience to 
be accessible to consciousness. Or, to put it in negative terms, this means that something 
that is not in principle accessible to consciousness cannot be a quale. But such an 
interpretation seems to be stronger than what Dretske would want to claim, since he 
admits that animals that lack metarepresentational capacities or young children who 
have not yet developed those capacities nevertheless have conscious1 qualitative 
experiences. Actually, Dretske attribute this strong interpretation of the accessibility 
thesis to the advocates of higher-order theories of state consciousness, such as 
Armstrong (1980) and he rejects such theories precisely because they force one to deny 
that animals and young children can have conscious experiences. 
A weaker reading of this accessibility thesis limits its scope to creatures endowed 
with metarepresentational capacities: qualia are among the states that a creature 
endowed with metarepresentational capacities could in principle have conscious access 
to. Interpreted in this way, the thesis imposes a constraint on a theory of qualia: a theory 
of the nature of qualia cannot be satisfactory if it does not account for the possibility that 
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qualia be the objects of introspective knowledge in creatures endowed with the 
necessary introspective capacities. But Dretske tells us that his theory of qualia can 
satisfy this constraint since it claims (1) that to be capable of introspective knowledge is 
to have the metarepresentational capacity to represent its representations as 
representations, and (2) that qualia are but a special variety of representational states. 
However, a large part of what goes on in the mind, including a large number of 
representations, is not accessible to consciousness5. Hence, one might yet wonder why a 
creature with metarepresentational capacities should apply those capacities to its 
perceptual experiences. 
It is possible to answer this question by giving the accessibility thesis a Darwinian 
interpretation. This is an approach taken by Shoemaker (1991). Roughly, the reasoning 
is the following. Creatures that are the outcome of natural selection would not have 
developed metarepresentational capacities unless those capacities had positive 
consequences for the survival and reproduction of those creatures. It is likely that the 
major advantage conferred by such capacities is to make possible the attribution to 
oneself and to others of mental states, and thus to allow for the prediction of future 
behavior. This serves as a basis for the development of a richer pattern of social 
interactions between conspecifics which in turn increases the chances of survival and 
reproduction of the members of the species. But the success of such cooperative 
interactions depends not only on the ability individuals have of conveying their 
intentions; it depends also on their ability to communicate what their reasons are for 
having those intentions. Those reasons will include the reasons they have for the beliefs 
that justify their intentions.6 This is where, according to Shoemaker, access to sense 
experience comes in: “In forming beliefs based on sense-perception, one will be 
handicapped if one does not have the ability to be aware of how things look, sound, feel, 
etc., to one, and so is not in a position to consider whether conditions are such that 
things looking (sounding, etc.) that way to one is a good reason for thinking that they are 
that way” (1991: 515). 
Although Dretske is in agreement with Shoemaker when he insists that qualia must 
be accessible to consciousness, his remarks on the problem of blindsight suggest that he 
does not completely share Shoemaker’s views. One should note, first, that Shoemaker 
wants to maintain a distinction between the intentional properties of our perceptual 
experiences and the phenomenal, non-intentional properties of these experiences that he 
identifies with qualia. By constrast, as we have seen, Dretske rejects this distinction and 
claims that qualia are nothing but sensory representational properties of our perceptual 
experiences. Although this is a major disagreement, this is not their fundamental point 
of divergence as far, at least, as the problem of blindsight is concerned. 
Shoemaker’s Darwinian argument on the usefulness of the accessibility to 
consciousness of qualia clearly involves consciousness2. It is relatively easy to 
extrapolate his view on blindsight in human beings from what he says on the possibility 
that the bat’s echolocation be ‘blindsighted’. Shoemaker (1991) assumes it to be a fact 
that bats have little or nothing in the way of introspective access to their internal states. 
He thinks that bats nevertheless have innate quality spaces, that there is some similarity 
                                                 
5In particular, this is the case with the intermediary representations computed by the linguistic or 
sensory modules, such as, for instance, the primal sketches in Marr’s theory of vision or the deep 
syntactic representations of sentences  in a Chomskian conception of a linguistic module.  
6 The argument offered by Shoemaker constitutes a “social” version of a Darwinian justification of 
the existence of phenomenal experience. But it is also possible to give the Darwinian justification a 
more “indivualistic” flavour, by claiming for instance that conscious control of one’s actions as 
opposed to their automatic control  brings with it the benefit of flexibility. This is, in particular, the 
line of reasoning taken by Weizkrantz (1988). 
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ordering of the sensory states produced by the stimuli available to them. He claims that 
it is in virtue of these similarity relations that these sensory states have properties that 
corresponds to some of the roles played by qualia. In other words, qualia as types are 
functionally individuated by their identity and similarity conditions. Insofar as, in the 
case of bats, these states are not accessible to consciousness, since it is assumed that 
bats have little or no introspective capacities, Shoemaker speaks of ‘quasi-qualia’. 
Given those views, it seems reasonable to assume that Shoemaker would describe the 
phenomenon of blindsight as a situation in which a creature has visual quasi-qualia, but 
has no introspective access to them. To put it otherwise, blindsighters have sensory 
states endowed with qualitative properties, but they have no conscious access to the 
qualitative properties of those states. Insofar as certain ‘beliefs’7 are more or less 
automatically formed on the basis of the information conveyed by these sensory states, 
the blindsighters have those beliefs, but lacking a conscious access to qualia, they can 
offer no justification for them. 
By constrast, Dretske takes blindsight to be a problem related to consciousness1 and 
not consciousness2. What blindsighters lack, according to him, is visual experience: 
these people have no sensory representations of the objects and properties visually 
presented to them. They are not visually conscious1 of these objects. But the analysis 
Dretske offers of blindsight seems hardly compatible with some of the other views he 
holds. Dretske accepts that, although lacking visual experience, blindsighters have 
nevertheless access to at least part of the information normally conveyed through visual 
experience, since they are capable, in certain conditions, of taking appropriate action 
towards objects, and that their statistically significant performance towards those objects 
would not be explainable unless it was assumed that they have this information.8 
Dretske suggests that blindsighters have no visual experience of the present situation but 
that they nevertheless process part of the conceptual representations that are necessary 
for the control and guidance of deliberate intentional action, and that, in normal 
subjects, are formed on the basis of conscious visual experience. Dretske acknowledges 
that those facts are puzzling . But, to my mind, they are more then just puzzling, they 
contradict Dretske’s account of consciousness. 
Recall that, according to Dretske’s representational theory, a visual experience is but 
a sensory experience of an object or a situation and that sensory representations are 
states whose organizational function it is to supply information to a cognitive system for 
the construction of conceptual representations that can be used in the control and 
regulation of behavior. Conversely, conceptual representations are built from sensory 
                                                 
7 Here the term ‘beliefs’ serves to designate the representations formed on the basis of visual 
information and used for the guidance of certain actions. That such representations are indeed formed 
seems to be demonstrated by the fact that blindsighters are capable (when forced) to take appropriate 
action towards objects visually presented to them and that the success of their performance can only 
be explained if we accept that they have formed those representations. See the next footnote for 
examples of such actions. A number of philosophers will claim that other conditions must be satisfied 
as well for a representation to be a belief in the full sense of the term. They are certainly right and this 
is why I use quotes. Let us note however that those ‘beliefs’ share a number of properties with fully 
fledged beliefs: their are representations of states of the world, they involve if not conceptualization 
in a strong sense at least a certain categorization or digitalization of sensory information and, most 
importantly, they guide action. 
8For instance, blindsighters asked to reach out for an object presented in their blind visual field — 
and that they deny seeing — are nevertheless able to reach for it accurately and to adopt a hand shape 
appropriate to the object presented. Or, placed in forced-choice situations, they are able to ‘guess’ 
quite accurately for the presence or the absence of an object, to guess whether the object presented is 
a horizontal or a vertical bar, whether it is moving or not, whether they are presented with an X or an 
O, and so on. For more details, see Weizkrantz (1986, 1988), Marcel (1988), Young & de Haan 
(1993). 
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representations. In particular, epistemic perception constitutes a case of displaced 
perception: we acquire a conceptual perceptual representation by having a sensory 
representation. Furthermore, according to Dretske’s representational theory of qualia, a 
system that has a sensory representation is by definition conscious1 of what his 
representation is a representation of, provided that the sensory representation in question 
be a representation for the system and not merely in the system. A sensory 
representation is a representation for the system, if the system can exploit it for the 
construction of conceptual representation, and hence for the control and regulation of 
behavior. 
We are now in a position to better appreciate Dretske’s uncomfortable situation. 
Dretske acknowledges that it is necessary to attribute to blindsighters certain conceptual 
representations about the objects they say they are not visually aware of, in order to 
explain the appropriateness of their actions towards those objects. Dretske also claims 
that conceptual representations are built from sensory representations. As a result, he is 
forbidden by his theory to attribute conceptual representations to those individuals 
without at the the same time attributing them the sensory representations that are 
necessary for their construction. But, insofar as he also contends that having qualitative 
experiences or qualia is simply having sensory experiences, if he attributes visual 
sensory experiences to blindsighters, he thereby also attributes them visual qualia. But 
then, he cannot consistently maintain that what blindsighters lack is visual experience. If 
one wants to preserve the consistency of Dretske’s position, one possible move would 
be to argue that the visual sensory representations present in blindsighters are 
representations in the cognitive system but not for the cognitive system. But one realizes 
that this move is in fact blocked, when one considers that the condition for a sensory 
representation to be a representation for a system is that the system be capable of 
exploiting it for the construction of conceptual representation and the regulation of 
behavior. Now, in the case of blindsight, this is precisely in order to account for the 
presence in the patients of conceptual representations playing a role in the control of 
behavior, that we had to postulate sensory representations. These representations are 
thus representations for the system and, according to Dretske’s theory, this condition is 
sufficient for the system to be conscious1 of them. Thus, holding that the impairment 
suffered by blindsighters is an impairment in consciousness1 leads to contradictions in 
Dretske’s representational theory of the mental. 
One way for Dretske to avoid those contradictions would be to stop regarding 
blindsight as a problem concerning consciousness1 and to consider it rather as a 
problem concerning introspective access to visual qualia and thus as a deficit in 
consciousness2. Using Shoemaker’s terminology, one could say that what characterizes 
blindsighters is that in the visual modality they have only quasi-qualia. Recall, however, 
that there would remain this difference between Dretske and Shoemaker that for Dretske 
qualia and quasi-qualia can be defined in terms of sensory representational properties, 
whereas for Shoemaker qualitative properties are distinct from intentional properties. 
We have seen that Dretske was defining introspective consciousness in terms of meta-
representational properties. Blindsighters would then suffer from a metarepresentational 
deficit vis-à-vis their visual experience. The trouble with this explanation is that it 
invites the conclusion that all beings lacking metarepresentational capacities or having 
yet to develop those capacities would be in the same position vis-à-vis their experiences 
as the blindsighter vis-à-vis his visual experiences. 
To put it bluntly, Dretske seems to be confronted with an unpleasant dilemma. He 
must choose between (1) putting in the same category animals, young children and 
blindsighters, by attributing them the same phenomenology or rather lack of it, or (2) if 
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he wants blindsight to remain a special case, different from the case of animals and 
young infants, to make his theory self-contradictory. Let us note in passing, that, at first 
sight at least, Shoemaker seems to be in a better position. By refusing to identify 
phenomenal properties to intentional properties, he gives himself more room to 
maneuver. He can, for instance, help himself with a distinction between a conscious 
access to the phenomenal properties of representations and a conscious access to their 
intentional properties and, hence, claim that what characterizes blindsight is lack of 
conscious access to the phenomenal properties of representations but not to their 
intentional properties. He could also argue that since phenomenal properties are not 
representational properties, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to have 
metarepresentational capacities to be conscious of them, and this would allow him to 
attribute to young children and to some animal species at least, real qualia and not 
merely quasi-qualia. However, my aim here is not to assess the value of Shoemaker’s 
theory. It may have to face other difficulties. Anyway, it does not seem to be directly 
susceptible to the same criticisms as Dretske’s theory. 
 
III 
In the second half of this paper, I will be concerned with what the conditions for the 
identity or difference between qualitative experiences are and with how they they can be 
spelled out in the framework of Dretske’s representational theory. I shall try to highlight 
a number of difficulties that arise in this setting. The present section discusses problems 
regarding the possibility of qualia inversions. 
Dretske contends that the qualitative character of perceptual experience is not 
functionally definable. What he means is that it is not definable in terms of an identity 
or a difference in discriminatory behavior. His objection to the functionalist approach to 
qualia is the well-known objection that such an approach cannot account for 
possibilities such as the inversion of the color spectrum. Dretske’s own example of 
qualia inversion involves not colors but tastes. Two individuals could be equally 
incapable of discriminating wines and thus each have all red wines taste the same to 
him. It is nevertheless possible that all red wines would taste to one the way fine 
Burgundies taste to a connoisseur, and that all red wines would taste to the other the 
way a cheap Chianti tastes to a Connoisseur.  
According to Dretske, a representational theory of qualitative experience can account 
for such possibilities. Recall that, in outline, Dretske’s representational theory identifies 
qualia with phenomenal properties, i.e. the properties that an object is sensuously (and 
systemically) represented as having. In order to account for possibilities such as the 
possibility of color inversion, without postulating that they constitute a brute, irreducible 
fact, one needs to be able to characterize objectively the differences between qualitative 
experiences even when they do not give rise to publicly observable differences in 
discriminatory behavior. In other words, one must be able to maintain a distinction 
between discriminated properties and sensuously represented properties. There is in 
Dretske’s theory of representations a distinction that may help us in this task. This is the 
distinction between indicator capacities and indicator functions. The notion of an 
indicator function plays a crucial role in Dretske’s account of misrepresentation, 
considered as the result of a discrepancy between what a token of a state actually 
indicates and what it is its function to indicate. Now, the problem with a purely 
functional definition of qualia is, Dretske claims, that it makes such a discrepancy 
impossible since sensory qualities are defined in terms of what can actually be 
discriminated. By constrast, if, as he suggests, qualia are defined in terms of 
representational properties, it remains possible to draw a distinction between what a 
sensory state actually discriminates and what it is its function to discriminate. 
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A theory that identifies qualia with representational properties and that defines those 
properties in turn in terms of their indicator functions presents in Dretske’s opinion two 
important advantages. First, insofar as what a system actually discriminates is not 
necessarily a direct reflection of what its states have as their function to discriminate, 
qualia defined in terms of those functions can have a subjective or private character: the 
differences between qualia do not necessarily express themselves in the behavior of the 
system in which they exist. Second, the nature of qualia is nevertheless objectively 
determinable : insofar as qualia are biologically inherited systemic representations, to 
determine the nature of a quale is to determine the biological function of states of this 
type. The nature of qualia is thus as objectively determinable as are the functions of 
bodily organs.  
In Explaining Behavior (1988), Dretske offers a detailled discussion of the conditions 
necessary for attributing indicator functions to the states of a system. He distinguishes 
between two types of natural processes that may explain how the states of a system can 
acquire a indicator function: natural selection and individual learning. It is natural 
selection that is assumed to be responsible for the existence of sensory representational 
properties. According to Dretske’s proposed story, states of a certain type E in an 
organism have it as their biological function to indicate the presence of Fs, iff: (1) in the 
ancestors of this organism, states of this type were indicators of (inter alia) the presence 
of Fs in the conditions then prevalent in their environment, (2) states of type E 
contributed in these ancestors to the causation of a behavior B whose success was 
(partly) dependent on the presence of Fs and (3) the reason why states of this type have 
been retained by natural selection is that they indicated F and contributed to the 
causation of B. In such a framework, to define a quale is to identify its indicator 
function. This in turn requires that the correct selectionist explanation accounting for the 
presence of this type of states in members of a given species be found.  
We can now present in some more detail the strategy Dretske wants to use in order to 
account for the possibility that organisms whose behaviors are indistinguishable may 
nevertheless have different qualitative experiences (or equally, although the case is less 
often considered, that individuals whose discriminatory behaviors are different 
nevertheless have identical qualitative experiences). The strategy consists in exploiting 
the possibility that there exists a discrepancy or departure between what a state 
belonging to a certain type (or even a certain state type) has the function of indicating 
and what it actually indicates. The discrepancy can have causes that are either external 
to the organism or internal to it. It can be the result of a change in the environment: the 
background conditions upon which the indicator relations are contingent can have 
undergone changes and not correspond anymore today to the background conditions that 
played a role in the selectionist explanation. This discrepancy can also be due to 
dysfunctions in the organism itself, either transitory dysfunctions (tiredness, illness, etc.) 
or more or less permanent dysfunctions (genetic defects, breakdowns due to ageing, 
etc.). In the case of qualia, the discrepancy can be all the more radical since we are 
dealing with innate systemic representations, whose indicator functions depend on 
natural selection. The time-scale that goes together with explanations of that kind is 
such that it is conceivable that in a given individual or even in one or several 
generations of individuals in a given species, a systematic discrepancy exists between 
the indicator functions of certain states and what those states do in fact indicate. 
If we go back to Dretske oenological example, we might explain the difference in 
qualitative experience between Jean who enjoys Burgundy qualia and Giovanni who has 
to be content with Chianti qualia in the following way. Human beings are normally 
endowed with a system of gustatory (and olfactory) sensory state types. States of each 
type have it as their function to represent a different quality of taste. As members of the 
 
13 
human species, Jean and Giovanni both have states with those functions. Both of them, 
however, suffer malfunctions of their system of sensory gustatory representations, but 
they are different malfunctions. In the case of Jean, the diagnosis is the following: Jean 
has lost the ability to realize sensory states corresponding to representations of wine 
tastes other than Burgundy and stimuli that in normal subjects cause such states cause in 
Jean representational states corresponding to the taste of Burgundy. Mutatis mutandis, 
Giovanni has lost the capacity to realize sensory states corresponding to representations 
of wine tastes other than the taste of Chianti and stimuli that in normal subjects cause 
such states cause in Giovanni representational states corresponding to the taste of 
Chianti. 
Admittedly, the explanation Dretske gives of his example could be correct. However, 
one can complain that it does not have the generality required to account for all the 
possible cases of differences in qualitative experiences that are not reflected in 
behavioral differences. I tend to think that the reason why his explanation of the wine 
example seems at first sight acceptable is that there is an important difference between 
that example and the problem of inverted spectrum in its traditional guise. Certainly, by 
hypothesis, we have in both cases qualitative differences not accompanied by behavioral 
differences. For instance, the fact that Jean enjoys Burgundy qualia each time he drinks 
wine does not make him more adept to wine-drinking than poor Giovanni fated to cheap 
Chianti taste. However, the wine example supposes that in the case of both Jean and 
Giovanni there is a systematic discrepancy between what their sensory states actually 
indicate and what they have as their function to indicate. By contrast, in the original 
example of the inverted color spectrum, it may be supposed that one of the two 
protagonists has sensory states that actually indicate what it is their function to indicate. 
The example of the inverted color spectrum raises other problems, as noted by 
Dretske who devised his wine example in order to avoid those. A frequently mentioned 
objection to the inverted spectrum is that it would necessarily disturb the organization of 
an highly structured quality space and thus would have consequences detectable in 
behavior. Insofar as Dretske grants the possibility in principle of a spectrum inversion 
and in order not to get lost in subsidiary discussions concerning the plausibility of such 
or such particular example, I will examine the possibility in purely theoretical terms. 
The situation I will consider is that of two individuals whose visual experiences are 
minimally complex, and whose corresponding quality spaces are minimally structured 
with only two possible values. 
The situation of our two individuals, Tictac and Tactic, is the following: (1) they both 
make the same discriminations between two classes of stimuli on the basis of their 
quality space, (2) they have inverted qualitative experience, and (3) Tictac qualitative 
experiences represent accurately what they are supposed to represent. Tictac 
distinguishes the stimuli presented to him in two classes, the Fs and the Gs. The Fs 
cause in Tictac tokens of a state type M corresponding to qualitative experience of type 
tic and having the function of indicating the presence of Fs. The Gs cause in Tictac 
tokens of a state type N corresponding to qualitative experience of type tac and having 
the function of indicating the presence of Gs. We have, let us suppose, an evolutionary 
story that explains why Tictac’s M states have it as their function to represent Fs and 
why its N states have it as their function to represent Gs. By hypothesis, Tactic does the 
exact same discriminations as Tictac, but in his case Fs cause states of type N* and 
qualitative experiences of type tac, whereas Gs cause states of type M* and qualitative 
experiences of type tic.9  
                                                 
9 I speak of Tactic’s M* and N* states rather than simply inverting M and N states in order to avoid 
a possible causal objection. According to the objection, it would be a violation of the principle of the 
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How can we explain Tactic’s situation? A possible explanation, along the lines of 
Dretske’s account, would be to claim, first, that in Tactic’s ancestors M* states have 
(just as M states in Tictac’s ancestors) been selected because they indicated the presence 
of Fs, and similarly for N* and Gs, but that, second, in Tactic a genetic defect was 
responsible for a the connections getting crossed. But an alternative explanation would 
consist in claiming that in Tactic’s ancestors , M* states were selected because they 
indicated the presence of Gs and, similarly for N* and Fs. In other words, according to 
this alternative story, it was benefical for both Tictac’s and Tactic’s ancestors to 
discriminate between the Fs and the Gs, but the ones achieved the discrimination by 
associating M states to Fs and N states to Gs, the others by associating N* to Fs and M* 
to Gs. 
What reasons could one put forward in favor of one story over the other? Dretske 
could claim that the situation as described in the second explanation is impossible since 
if the function of M states in Tictac’s ancestors had been to indicate the presence of Fs, 
then these states would be qualitatively identical to the N* states of Tactic and his 
ancestors, which contradicts our initial hypothesis. But such a rejoinder seems to beg the 
question in favor of a representational theory of qualia. Actually, to be honest, one 
should admit that the two competing explanations rest on incompatible assumptions and 
thus that each is begging the question in its own way. However, if the Tictac vs. Tactic 
case is a correct illustration of what philosophers usually mean when they consider the 
possibility of qualia inversion and if it is acknowledged that such a situation is 
theoretically possible, it is clear that Dretske must either admit that his theory denies 
such a possibility (the only possible cases of inversion being the weaker cases illustrated 
by the wine example), or, if he grants the possibility of strong qualia inversion, concede 
that his theory does not account for it. 
Dretske (1995: 72) contends that, according to the representational theory of 
experience he advocates, the qualitative character of the experience is not functionally 
definable but is nevertheless physically definable. I am afraid that that his statement is 
somewhat misleading. It would be more accurate to say that according to his theory, 
qualitative experience is not functionally definable in the descriptive sense of a 
functional definition — the way a thing functions — which correspond to the use 
classical functionalists make of the term, but that it is functionally definable in the 
teleological sense of function — where function takes a normative dimension. Thus, the 
qualitative character of experience is physically definable only in the sense in which a 
biological function is physically definable. Quite surely, ‘physically definable’ should 
not be taken here in the strong sense of a physicalist reduction. For Dretske’s suggestion 
that qualitative experience be defined in teleofunctional terms to answer the problem of 
qualia inversion, it would have to be supplemented by the further assumption that there 
can be no situations where qualitative differences occur between states indistinguishable 
                                                                                                                                               
nomological character of causation to assume that, whereas Tictac and Tactic have both M states and 
N states, the Fs cause in one M states and in the other N states. Let us note, however, that the force of 
the objection depends, on the one hand, on what conception one holds of physical causality and, on 
the other hand, on the further stipulation that that there are no other aspects of the cognitive 
organization of Tictac or Tactic that might account for such a difference in the effects produced by 
the same cause. Besides, in order to forestall another objection, let us note that the situation 
described, where different states types — M and N for Tictac and M*and N* for Tactic — correspond 
to the values of the quality space, is perfectly compatible with Dretske’s representational theory, since 
the theory holds that the indicator function of a type state and hence its qualitative aspects depend on 
relational properties of tokens of the type and not on their intrinsic properties. Thus, the issue is not 
whether states belonging to the same physical (or neurological) type can have different qualitative 
properties, but whether states belonging to the same representational type can have different 
qualitative properties. 
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in terms of their teleofunctional characterisation. But Dretske offers no independent 
argument in favor of that assumption. 
Now, its seems it is precisely intuitions concerning the plausibility of such situations 
that induce us to accept the theoretical possibility of qualia inversions. The idea behind 
those intuitions is that what matters is that organisms be capable of making the 
discriminations that are important for their survival, not that that they make those 
discriminations in such or such a way. If I am right to think that this is the main 
motivation in favor of the possibility of qualia inversion, then Dretske’s theory does not 
solve the problem. It leaves no room for a distinction between what is discriminated and 
how discriminations are made, or, to put it more precisely, between what it is that the 
sensory states of an organism are supposed to discriminate (their indicator functions) 
and how they achieve their function. But his theory does no show either that our 
intuitions concerning the possibility of such a distinction are misguided. 
 
IV 
In this last section, I would like to examine another consequence of Dretske’s theory. 
It concerns the qualitative differences between experiences in the different sensory 
modalities. It follows from his theory that the qualitative differences between 
experiences in different modalities (for instance, feeling vs. seeing) are never ascribable 
to the difference in the modalities by itself, but are always related either to differences in 
discriminatory powers or to differences in the conceptual exploitation of the information 
obtained. This consequence is unfortunate insofar as it forbids Dretske from availing 
himself of an important justification for the existence of qualia.  
Dretske (1995: 93-95) offers a brief discussion of “what it is like to be an X”. He 
points out that in order to know what it is like for a creature to have a qualitative 
experience of a given type, one needs to determine what it is that this qualitative 
experience represents. But he also claims that to know what it is like to be this creature, 
one has to know all the properties that the creature senses. Thus, for Dretske, what it is 
like to be such or such a creature is the total sum of all the properties it can experience. 
In other words, for there to be a difference between what it is like to be an A and what it 
is like to be a B, it is both necessary and sufficient that there be at least one property that 
one of the two creatures but not the other is capable of sensuously representing.  
For Dretske, the qualitative differences between experiences in different modalities 
are explained by the fact that we do not experience the exact same set of properties in 
the different modalities. To take his example, although an experience of movement can 
be either visual or tactile (or kinaesthetic), visual and tactile experiences are different, 
because when one visually experiences the movement of an object, one also experiences 
the object’s shape, color, size, direction of movement and a host of other properties, 
whereas when one has a tactile experience of movement, different properties are 
simultaneously experienced. Even when the two sets of properties partially overlap, 
there remains a residue of unshared properties that give each modality its specific 
qualitative character.  
From that account of the qualitative differences between modalities, it follows that if 
there where two creatures, who despite being equipped with different sensory 
modalities, would represent through those modalities the exact same set of properties, 
they would as a result have qualitatively identical experiences (in the same situations). 
Similarly, it follows from the theory that an individual who would represent the same 
set of properties via two different modalities could not feel qualitative differences 
between experiences in one or the other modality. By not considering the possibility that 
the qualitative differences between experiences in different sensory modalities could be 
more than just differences concerning the properties represented, Dretske runs counter 
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to pretheoretical intuition. Of course, this in itself is no devastating objection. It seems 
to me, however, that there is an important link between (1) our ability to discriminate 
between different sensory modalities, (2) the reasons that can be invoked in favor of the 
accessibility to consciousness of qualia and (3) a fundamental property of our relation to 
objects in perception, that Husserl described as the Leibhaftigkeit or bodily presence of 
the object in perception and that distinguishes perception from other cognitive modes, 
such as imagination or memory. Dretske does not account for this property of bodily 
presence. His distinction between sensory and conceptual representations allows him to 
account for the difference between propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, 
intentions, etc., on the one hand, and attitudes the content of which is not propositional 
in form such as (non-epistemic) perception, but not for the differences between 
perception, imagination or ‘imagistic memories’10. 
Let us first consider the link between a capacity to distinguish between sensory 
modalities and possible justifications of the accessibility to consciousness of sensory 
experience. I have already mentioned the suggestion that the main advantage of the 
accessibility to consciousness of sensory experience is to give us access to justifications 
we can then produce in favor of the beliefs we have formed on the basis of sensory 
information. But we can go further and suggest that, by knowing why we entertain those 
beliefs, what their grounds are, whether those grounds are sound or conjectural, we can 
voluntarily decide whether we need to check them further, whether we need to gather 
more information and when we must revise certain beliefs. In other words, accessibility 
to consciousness allows us to improve the reliability and relevance to the success of our 
actions of our perceptually formed beliefs. It is consistent with this hypothesis that the 
consciousness we have of our perceptual experience should include an awareness of the 
modality of these experiences. The process of justification of our perceptually based 
beliefs operates largely on-line, it is subject to immediate testing. If, for instance, I think 
that I may be seeing a friend on the other side of the street, before I accept this as a 
belief, I will proceed to further perceptual checking, observe with attention his gait, 
features, haircut, and so on. But there is no doubt that the process of verification will be 
quite different depending on whether I seem to see this friend in the street or to hear his 
voice in the next room. In the former case, I shall look carefully, in the latter I shall 
listen closely to check whether this is really his voice I am hearing.  
Dretske would probably answer that in the example I have just given, I am informed 
of the sensory modality involved via the type of properties represented and that there is 
no need for further explanations. One can imagine, however, cases where the belief 
being checked concerns one or several properties that can in principle be sensuously 
represented in different modalities, but that in that instance were actually represented in 
only one of those. It seems implausible that the individual should proceed blindly (sorry 
for the pun!) in order to determine the modality involved and the type of check needed. 
But how do we distinguish between modalities if not merely on the basis of the 
properties represented? A possible answer would be to run directly counter to Dretske 
and to claim that our perceptual experience has a qualitative dimension that cannot be 
accounted for in representational terms. But this may be underestimating the resources 
available to a representational approach. I shall try instead to exploit the further 
resources such an approach may have at its disposal and see what we can do with them.  
My suggestion is that a representational solution to the problem of Leibhaftigkeit and 
a representational solution to the problem of distinguishing between the modalities are 
                                                 
10 I use this term to refer to memories that involve imagistic representations as opposed to 
memories involving propositional content. This corresponds roughly to the distinction between 
memories linked to episodic memory and memories linked to generic memory. 
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closely related. This does not mean that the two problems are in fact but one and the 
same, since for instance, if we were dealing with creatures equipped with a unique 
sensory modality, we obviously would not have to distinguish between modalities, but 
we would still have to face the problem of bodily presence. Leibhaftigkeit is, according 
to Husserl, a fundamental property of perception that refers to the very specific form the 
relation between the subject and the object of the attitude takes in this cognitive mode. 
Husserl gives the following description:  
The object stands before us in perception as bodily present, as, to put it more 
precisely yet, actually present, as given in propria persona in the actual present. In 
imagination, the object does not stand before us in the mode of bodily presence 
(Leibhaftigkeit), of reality, of actual presence. Certainly, it stands before our eyes, 
but as an object that is not actually given now. It might be thought of as now 
present or as simultaneous to an actual present, but this presence is a presence in 
thought, not the presence that belongs to bodily presence, to the presence of 
perception. (1907, §4, pp. 14-15).  
Bouveresse (1995: 52-54) quotes the preceding excerpt from Husserl and wonders 
whether the contrast pointed out by Husserl between a situation in which an object is 
perceived and a situation in which it is simply represented (including represented as 
given here and now) is not such as to cast doubt on the well-foundedness of 
representational approaches to perception. 
I would like to suggest that, with respect to the problem of Leibhaftigkeit, a 
representational theory of perception may not be in a desperate position, provided that it 
takes into account the temporal dimension of perception and does not proceed to the 
reductive abstraction that makes perception something punctual and static. The idea that 
should be exploited is that perception has both a static simultaneous structure and a 
dynamic temporal structure, that there is a narrow link between the Leibhaftigikeit of the 
object in perception and the temporal dynamics of perception, and, finally, that the 
nature of our perceptual relation to the object gets displayed mainly in the flux of 
perception, that is in its temporal dynamics. 
Very schematically then, what characterizes perception and accounts for its 
distinctive character is the fact that it exhibits a temporal organization the dynamics of 
which is under the dependence of both the object and the subject’s activity of perceptual 
exploration. The object is given in propria persona insofar as the lawful organization of 
the perceptual sequence constitutes a test of its presence. Briefly put, the fact that in 
perception the object appears given in propria persona results from the conjunction of 
the three following conditions: (1) the temporal dynamics of the sequence of perceptual 
moments does not depend entirely on the perceiver, (2) what depends on the perceiver is 
correlated with his perceptual-motor exploration activity11 , i. e. with an active 
perceptual exploration of the scene presented, and (3) what in this dynamics is not under 
the control of the perceiver nevertheless exhibits a lawful character. I contend that in the 
other cognitive modes, the three conditions are not simultaneously satisfied. In 
particular, those other modes display no systematic correlations with the motor activity 
of the subject. I can, for instance, close my eyes and imagine a cube, I can even imagine 
                                                 
11 By perceptual-motor activity, I mean motor activity the purpose of which is to obtain perceptual 
information from  the world. The effects of this activity on perception can have a greater or lesser 
strength. For instance, moving one’s head usually has a marked effect on the flux of visual 
information, which is not the case with straightening one’s back or flexing one’s toes. Besides, a 
change in the informational flux can be a side effect of some motor activity aiming at different goal, 
or it can be the intended effect of motor activity. It the latter case, we have an instance of perceptual-
motor exploration activity. 
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myself turning around the cube, I can during this exercise move my head and my body 
in different ways, but, unless by a coincidence or because of my deliberately intenting it 
to be so, my movements will not be correlated with the sequences of images of the cube 
that I imagine myself to be turning around. 
So, it seems that we might be able to account for the Leibhaftigkeit of the object in 
perception in the framework of a representational theory of perception, provided that we 
make use of a richer notion of representation. In other words, this seems to be possible, 
provided that, as a first condition, the notion of representation used covers both sensory 
representations taken in the static way in which Dretske considers them and sensory 
properties taken in a dynamical way. Let us note, that a dynamic sensory representation 
is not merely a temporal sequence of static representations, but that it is a representation 
of the relationships between the successive static representations. The order of 
complexity of dynamic representations is thus higher that of static sensory 
representations. This means that dynamic representations require more sophistated 
representational mechanisms that can extract relations between representational 
moments in a perceptual sequence. Although necessary, this condition is not yet 
sufficient. If the sketch I gave of an analysis of Leibhaftigkeit is correct, to enjoy 
Leibhaftigkeit, an organism must also be able to discriminate between those relations 
that depend on his activity and those that do not. Thus, it is necessary to allow for a 
further mechanism, the function of which will be to discriminate between those two 
types of relations by extracting correlations between the dynamical properties of 
perceptual experience and the motor activity of the organism. But one of the outcomes 
of such a discrimination will be to tell us which sensory modality is involved.  
The object is given in propria persona, through those relations between perceptual 
moments the lawful character of which is not ascribable to the motor activities of the 
perceiver. But, simultaneously, what distinguishes between the different modalities is 
the type of correlations they exhibit between the dynamic properties of the perceptual 
sequence and the sensory-motor activity of the organism. In other words, what 
perceptual sequences it is possible or typical to experience, depends on constraints 
ensuing both from the nature of the object experienced and from the nature of the 
sensory modality involved. To put it roughly, each sensory modality has its own 
exploratory modes that impose constraints on the nature of possible or typical perceptual 
sequences in the modality. Hence, assuming that the exact same sensory properties can 
be represented in two different modalities, the resulting perceptual experiences might 
nevertheless have a different temporal dynamics. What it is like to sensuously represent 
an object in one modality could thus be different from what is is like to represent the 
same object in a different modality. 
 
To sum up, I have attempted to bring into light certain difficulties or weaknesses in 
Dretske’s theory of perceptual experience. However, not all the difficulties examined 
seem to me to have the same degreee of seriousness. I should like to close this paper 
with a brief assessment on their respective consequences for the prospect of a 
representational approach to perception. The first problem I discussed concerned the 
relation between qualia and consciousness and the use Dretske makes in his analysis of 
blindsight of the distinction between consciousness1, that does not require conceptual or 
metarepresentational capacities, and consciousness2, that requires by constrast 
metarepresentational capacities. It seems to me that this problem casts light on an 
important flaw in the organization of Dretske’s theory, but not, however, that it poses an 
insuperable challenge to a representational approach to perceptual experience, provided 
such an approach operates with finer distinctions than the simple dichotomy between 
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sensory and conceptual representations and that, at the same time, it acknowledges 
several levels of integration between representations and actions.12 Assuming that the 
brief sketch I gave of a possible explanation of the Leibhaftigkeit of perception and of 
our capacity to distinguish between modalities is correct, or, say, points approximately 
in the right direction, these two properties should not constitute fatal obstacles for a 
representational theory of perceptual experience. What a purely representational theory 
of perceptual experience seems unable to account for, however, is the possibility of 
qualia inversions, such as the inversion of the color spectrum. Dretske’s theory does 
indeed explain some weaker forms of qualia inversions, as illustrated by his wine 
example, but he does not offer a comprehensive explanation of possible qualia 
inversions, that embraces fully fledged cases of inversion. In this respect, a 
representational theory displays no decisive advantage vis-à-vis a functional theory of 
qualia. Individual qualia are no more teleofunctionally or representationally definable 
than they are functionally definable. A major problem that remains unsolved and 
apparently insoluble in a purely representational framework is what one could call the 
problem of the qualitative multirealizability of representational contents. 
 
                                                 
12 Neuropsychologists working on blindsight insist on the existence of different types of 
representations corresponding to different levels or modes of processing of sensory information, for 
instance “where” representations (localization) versus “what” representations (object identification). 
They also emphasize the existence of different levels of integration between representations and 
actions or behaviors. For instance, certain dissociations seem to point to the existence of a system of 
“how” representations, responsible for a pragmatic processing of sensory information which directly 
links this information to certain motor behavior, without the mediation of “where” or “what” 
representations (Rossetti, Rode, & Boisson, 1995). By contrast, other types of behaviors or actions 
operate in relation with more  symbolic or more detached levels of representations (Jeannerod, 1994; 
McCarthy & Warrington, 1990, Paillard, 1991; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Furthermore, one may 
think that conscious perceptual  experience is linked to detached or demodularized forms of 
representations (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). In Darwinian terms, one may think it would be useless to be 
conscious of representations the consequences of which we could not influence because they 
automatically unfold anyway. 
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